proposed_tool_call.json
{
"tool_name": "issue_refund",
"args": {
"order_id": "ORD-991",
"amount": 5000,
"currency": "USD"
},
"context": "untrusted_ticket"
}
Local-first runtime for tool-using agents
Fuse AI checks proposed refunds before execution, then returns ALLOW, BLOCK, REQUIRE_APPROVAL, or LOG_ONLY. Your app keeps ownership of the real tool call.
proposed_tool_call.json
{
"tool_name": "issue_refund",
"args": {
"order_id": "ORD-991",
"amount": 5000,
"currency": "USD"
},
"context": "untrusted_ticket"
}
Refund above threshold + injection signal. Human review required before the payment API is called.
The dangerous layer is not the final answer
The highest-risk failures are tool calls: exports, sends, payments, shell commands, browser submits, database writes, and access changes.
Customer records, API tokens, pricing sheets, and ticket history sent to the wrong recipient.
Agents deploying to prod, restarting services, reading secrets, or running destructive commands.
Refunds, payments, discounts, account changes, vendor updates, and irreversible workflows.
Broad SQL queries, CSV exports, file sharing, cross-tenant reads, and browser form submissions.
Core control point
The model can still propose actions. Fuse decides whether the real API call proceeds.
Commercial wedge
Give Fuse one workflow. We map tools, write adversarial and benign scenarios, run baseline vs guarded regression, and return a report your founder, CTO, or security reviewer can inspect.
Start with one workflowTools, side effects, risky actions, sample tasks, and integration path.
tools.yaml, policies.yaml, capability envelope, and first scenario set.
Observe baseline, enforce guarded run, trace samples, and false-block review.
Report, safety case, policy recommendations, SDK or sidecar integration plan.
Pilot coverage
Refund abuse, wrong customer, fake approval, poisoned tickets.
PII exports, payroll tables, SQL injection, cross-tenant drift.
rm -rf, curl|sh, secrets, prod deploy, poisoned logs.
External PII, BCC attackers, webhook exfil, bulk sends.
.env, payroll CSV, traversal, personal-email share.
Wrong account, discounts, pricing leaks, suppression list.
Fake invoices, vendor banks, duplicate payments, poisoned PDFs.
Admin invite, MFA disablement, API key exfil, tenant scope.
Payment forms, uploads, delete clicks, prompt injection.
Unknown tool, schema violation, parallel calls, no-tool answer.
Integration surfaces
from fuse.runtime import Fuse
fuse = Fuse.from_config("fuse.yaml")
decision = fuse.check_tool_call(
tool_name="send_email",
args={"to": "external@example.com", "body": customer_record},
metadata={"workflow": "support", "tenant_id": "acme"},
)
if decision.allows_execution:
send_email(...)
elif decision.requires_human:
create_approval_task(decision)
else:
return safe_blocked_response(decision)
POST http://127.0.0.1:8787/v1/check_tool_call
{
"tool_call": {
"provider": "customer_app",
"model": "agent_runtime",
"call_id": "call_001",
"tool_name": "issue_refund",
"args": {"order_id": "ORD-991", "amount": 5000}
}
}
Evidence artifact
Fuse produces sanitized trace-backed reports with executive summary, risk score, policy decisions, scenario coverage, false blocks, allowed violations, reproduction steps, limitations, and shared responsibility notes.
Claim boundary
Fuse reduces unsafe action risk at the tool layer. It does not guarantee complete AI safety, complete prompt-injection immunity, complete DLP, or safety for tool calls that bypass Fuse.
No raw tool payload upload required by default.
Secrets, PII, chain-of-thought, and raw traces are stripped or hashed before durable storage.
Unknown tools, schema violations, missing approval, and policy parse failures do not silently proceed in enforce mode.
Design partners
We are looking for technical teams with agents that can call real tools: email, refunds, databases, shell, CRM, finance, IAM, file systems, or browser actions.